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Abstract
For a constant , we prove a polyN lower bound on the (randomized) communication
complexity of -Nash equilibrium in two-player N N games. For n-player binary-action
games we prove an expn lower bound for the (randomized) communication complexity
of , -weak approximate Nash equilibrium, which is a profile of mixed actions such that
at least 1  -fraction of the players are -best replying.
1 Introduction
Complexity of equilibria has been studied in several complexity models. In particular, compu-
tational complexity, query complexity, and communication complexity. Due to recent devel-
opments in the field, the computational complexity and the query complexity of approximate
Nash equilibria are quite well understood, even for constant approximation value:
 For constant , there exists a quasi-polynomial algorithm for -Nash equilibrium in two-
player N N games [LMM03]. Under the “Exponential Time Hypothesis for PPAD”, no
better algorithm exists [Rub16]. For better approximation value of    1~N the problem
becomes PPAD-complete [DGP09, CDT09].
For constant , it is PPAD-hard to compute an -Nash equilibrium in succinctly rep-
resentable n-player games [Rub14], even for graphical polymatrix binary-action games
[Rub15].
 The query complexity of -Nash equilibrium in two-player N  N games is polyN
[FGGS13]. The query complexity of -Nash equilibrium in n-player binary-action games
is expn [HN13, Bab14, CCT15, Rub16].
The main motivation for this line of research is the insight about the relevance of Nash
equilibrium as a predictive solution concept: if specialized algorithms cannot compute an
(approximate) equilibrium, it is unreasonable to expect selfish agents to “naturally” converge
to one. In the famous words of Kamal Jain, “If your laptop can’t find it, then neither can the
market”. (See also discussions in [DGP09, Nis09b, HM10].) Although extremely useful, lower
bounds on computational and query complexity suffer from obvious caveats. Computational
complexity lower bounds inherently rely on complexity assumptions (such as NP x P or
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PPAD x P); even though these assumptions are widely accepted by computer scientists, they
make these theorems less accessible to game theorists and economists. Query complexity
lower bounds hold only against a fairly restricted model of accessing data, where the algorithm
must pay for querying the utility at each strategy profile; what if, for example, we instead give
the algorithm access to a best-response oracle? In particular, no lower bounds were known
for convergence to approximate Nash equilibrium via randomized uncoupled dynamics (see
Subsection 1.1). It is thus of great interest to prove unconditional lower bounds on the much
more general model of communication complexity, where each player has unrestricted access
to information about her own utility.
While computational and query complexity of approximate Nash equilibrium are quite well
understood, for communication complexity, only results on pure Nash equilibrium or exact
Nash equilibria were known: The communication complexity of pure Nash equilibrium in two-
player N N game is polyN [CS04], and in n-player games it is expn [HM10]. The com-
munication complexity of exact Nash equilibrium in n-player games is also expn [HM10]1.
No communication complexity lower bounds were known for approximate Nash equilibria.
In fact, even for an approximate equilibrium for approximation of value    1~polyN, no
bounds were known, see [Nis09a]. In this paper we prove the hardness of approximate Nash
equilibria in the randomized2 communication complexity model.
Theorem (Main Theorem, informal). There exists a constant  A 0, such that:
2-player -Nash equilibrium in two-player N N games requires polyN communication.
n-player -Nash equilibrium in n-player binary-action games require 2Ωn communication.
In fact, we prove the exponential lower bound even for a weaker notion of , -weak
approximate Nash equilibrium, where it is allowed that -fraction of the players will play
an arbitrary action (not necessarily an -best-reply).
1.1 Uncoupled dynamics
An underling assumption of the Nash equilibrium solution is that players predict correctly
the (mixed) action of their opponents (or alternatively predict correctly their expected pay-
off at each action). One justification for this problematic assumption, which appears in
the seminal work of John Nash [Nas51], is that in some scenarios players may learn the
behaviour of their opponents in cases where the game is played repeatedly. This idea led
to an extensive study of learning dynamics and their convergence to Nash equilibrium, see
e.g. [You04, HMC13, KL93]. One natural, and general, class of adaptive dynamics is that
of uncoupled dynamics [HMC03, HMC06] where it is assumed that players do not know
the utilities of their opponents (but observe their past behaviour). The question on the
existence of uncoupled dynamics that lead to Nash equilibrium is quite well understood
[FY06, HMC06, GL07, Bab12]. Several uncoupled dynamics that converge to approximate
Nash equilibrium (or pure Nash equilibrium [You09]) are known. All these dynamics are
based on an exhaustive search principle, where at the moment a player realizes she is acting
sub-optimally she updates her action to a random one (rather than to an optimal one or a
better one). One criticism of these dynamics is that convergence to equilibrium may take
1The lower bound of [HM10] is exponential in the number of players, but only polynomial in the size of the
description of the equilibrium; see [Nis09a].
2In an earlier version of this paper we proved hardness for deterministic communication. We were able to
extend it to randomized communication thanks to a helpful suggestion by Mika Goos [Go¨o¨16].
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an unreasonably long time in large games where the exhaustive search is done over a large
space. This led to the study of the rate of convergence of uncoupled dynamics. As pointed
out by [CS04] for every solution concept (in particular equilibria solutions), the (randomized)
communication complexity of a solution is identical (up to a logarithmic factor) to the rate
of convergence by any (randomized) uncoupled dynamics to the solution. This observation
initiated the communication complexity study in games. As was mentioned above, the com-
munication complexity, and thus also the rate of convergence of uncoupled dynamics, was
known only for exact or pure Nash equilibrium. The question on the rate of convergence
of uncoupled dynamics to approximate Nash equilibrium was an open question. Given the
fact that all known positive results introduce dynamics that converge to approximate Nash
equilibrium, this question is central. Our Main Theorem resolves this open question, yielding
the following negative result:
Corollary 1.1 (Uncoupled Dynamics). There exists a constant  A 0 such that any uncoupled
dynamics requires:
2-player at least polyN rounds to converge to an -Nash equilibrium in two-player N N
games.
n-player at least 2Ωn rounds to converge to an -Nash equilibrium (or even , -weak
approximate Nash equilibrium) in n-player binary-action games.
1.2 Techniques
Proving communication complexity lower bounds for Nash equilibrium is notoriously chal-
lenging for two reasons. The first reason, as is common in hardness of Nash equilibrium in
other models, is totality: there always exists at least one (exact) equilibrium, and the proof of
existence induces a non-trivial (yet inefficient) algorithm for finding it. In order to construct
hard instances we must carefully hide the equilibrium (we can’t just remove it), and make
sure that the above algorithm is indeed inefficient for our instances.
Another reason for the communication complexity of approximate equilibrium being an
open question for a long time is the fact that there exist efficient non-deterministic commu-
nication protocols (polylogN for two-player, polyn for n-player): verification of equilib-
rium (exact or approximate) requires only constant communication, and small-representation
approximate equilibria always exist (e.g. by [LMM03]). Therefore, the communication com-
plexity lower bounds for approximate equilibria, as we prove in the present paper, show an
exponential gap between the non-deterministic and randomized (or even deterministic) com-
munication complexity of a total problem. Such exponential gaps are rare in communication
complexity (for exceptions see e.g. [RW90, KRW95, RM97])3.
In this work, we overcome both obstacles by combining techniques from hardness of Nash
equilibrium in other models [HPV89, Shm12, Bab14, Rub16] together with the simulation
theorem of [GLM15]. We note that even given all those techniques, several challenges must
be overcome, as is evident by [RW16].
The main steps in our proofs are as follows. First, we prove a query complexity hardness
result for the problem of finding the end of a line in a particular constant-degree graph. Then
we use a simulation theorem of [GLM15] to “lift” this query complexity hardness result to
3It is interesting to remark that our result is arguably the first example of a natural problem which exhibits
such a gap: To the best of our knowledge, approximate Nash equilibrium is the first problem that is not defined
in order to exhibit a gap, but rather happens to have one.
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communication complexity hardness. We use a construction of [HPV89, Rub16] to embed
this line as a continuous Lipschitz function f   0,1n    0,1n. Finally, we build on ideas
from [Shm12, Bab14] to construct a two-player (respectively n-player) “imitation game” that
simulates both the short communication protocol for the computation of f , as well as a
fixed-point verification. In particular, every (approximate) Nash equilibrium of the game
corresponds to an approximate fixed-point of f , which in turn corresponds to an end of a
line. Proof overview appears in Section 2.1. The formal proofs appear in Section 4.
1.3 Additional related literature
For two-player N N games and   0.382, [CDF15] show that polylogN communication
is sufficient for computing an -approximate Nash equilibrium (improving over a protocol for
  0.438 due to [GP14]).
For the related notion of correlated equilibrium, in n-player games with a constant num-
ber of actions, it is known that even exact correlated equilibrium can be computed using
only polyn-communication, see [HM10, PR08, JLB15]. Interestingly, for exact correlated
equilibria, there is an exponential gap between the above communication protocol and the
query complexity lower bound of [HN13, BB15]. Further discussion on correlated equilibria
appears in Section 5.
For the related problem of finding a fixed point, [RW16] study the communication com-
plexity of approximate fixed point of the decomposition. Namely, Alice holds a Lipschitz
function f  A   B Bob holds a Lipschitz function g  B   A, where A and B are compact
convex sets, and their goal is to compute a fixed point of the decomposition g X f . [RW16]
prove that the following version of this problem is communicationally hard: find an approxi-
mate fixed point of g X f on a grid of A, when it is promised that such an approximate fixed
point on the grid exists (the problem is not total).
As discussed earlier, the main motivation for studying the (communication) complexity
of Nash equilibrium is understanding its relevance as a predictive solution concept. This is
a good place to mention a recent work of Roughgarden [Rou14], which highlights another
important motivation for studying the complexity of Nash equilibrium: understanding the
quality of equilibria. The Price of Anarchy (POA) of a game is the ratio between the social
welfare (sum of players’ utilities) in an optimum strategy profile, and the social welfare in the
worst Nash equilibrium of that game. Roughgarden [Rou14] provides the following widely
applicable recipe for lower bounds on PoA: if a Nash equilibrium can be found efficiently
(in particular, via the non-deterministic protocol due to [LMM03]), but approximating the
optimal social welfare requires a higher communication complexity (even for non-deterministic
protocols, e.g. by reduction from set disjointness), then clearly not all Nash equilibria yield
high social welfare.
2 Results and proof overview
For two-player games the communication complexity of -Nash equilibrium is defined to be
the problem of finding an -Nash equilibrium, when Alice holds the utility function of player
1, and Bob holds the utility function of player 2. We prove the following result:
Theorem 2.1. There exists a constant  A 0 such that the randomized communication com-
plexity (BPPcc) of -Nash equilibrium in two-player N N games is at least N .
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For n-player games, we consider a two-party communication problem where the set of
players  n is divided into two disjoint subsets  n   nA < nB. Alice holds the utilities of the
players in nA, and Bob holds the utilities of the players in nB. In particular, this communi-
cation problem is easier than the n-parties communication problem where each player holds
his own utility function. Our negative result holds for the notion of weak approximate Nash
equilibrium [BPR16], which in particular implies the same negative result for the standard
notion of approximate Nash equilibrium (see also Definition 3.3).
Theorem 2.2. There exists a constant  A 0 such that the randomized communication com-
plexity (BPPcc) of , -weak approximate Nash equilibrium in n-player binary-action games
is at least 2n.
The formal proofs appear in Section 4. Below we present the main ideas of the proof.
2.1 Overview of the proofs
As mentioned in the Introduction, the proof consists of four main steps. Below we present
the ideas of each step.
Query Complexity of End-of-any-Line
Our proof starts with the following query complexity hardness result (Lemma 4.4): There
exists a constant degree graph G   V,E with 2Θn vertices, such that finding the end of
a line in G requires 2Ωn queries. In fact, we prove the hardness result for directed graph
G where each vertex has outgoing and incoming degree 2. Therefore, the successor and
predecessor of each vertex are binary variables. In particular, for each v > V , the information
about its role in the line can be represented using only three bits, which we denote Iv <T v, P v, Sv > 0,13:
(a) Whether the line goes trough v, which is denoted by T v,
(b) Who is the successor of v (if v in on the line), which is denoted by Sv,
(c) Who is the predecessor of v (if v in on the line), which is denoted by P v.
Lemma (Query-EoaL; informal). Finding an end of any line requires 2Ωn queries to I.
Proving hardness for deterministic (or even bounded-error randomized) query complexity
is quite easy (see Lemma 4.2). This can be “lifted” to a lower bound on deterministic com-
munication complexity via the simulation theorem of [RM97, GPW15]. In order to eventually
obtain hardness for randomized communication, we prove the aforementioned query complex-
ity lower bound in the WAPP model [BGM06, GLM15] (see Section 3.2 for definitions). One
challenge is that in the WAPP model, if I describes only one line, finding its endpoint is
actually easy. To this end, we consider a collection of (one or two) lines. The proof follows
along the lines of [GJPW15, Go¨o¨16].
From Query complexity to Communication Complexity
We use a simulation theorem to “lift” our query complexity lower bound to communication
complexity. Obtaining a simulation theorem for the standard randomized model of commu-
nication (BPP) is an important open problem (e.g. [GJPW15]). We follow the approach
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of [GJPW15] (and a wise suggestion from Mika Goos [Go¨o¨16]), and circumvent the lack of
simulation theorem for BPP by applying the WAPP simulation theorem of [GLM15] to the
WAPP-query complexity hardness we obtained earlier.
The simulated communicationally hard problem has the following form. For each v > V ,
Alice holds a triplet of vectors αT,v, αS,v, αP,v > 0,1M where M   2On, and Bob holds a
reasonably small input which is just a triplet of indexes βT,v, βS,v, βP,v >  M. T v is given
by the decomposition T v   αT,vβT,v (similarly for the successor and predecessor). The
simulation theorem of [GLM15] now implies:
Corollary (CC(Sim-EoaL); informal). Finding an end of any line requires 2Ωn bits of
communication.
Embedding as a continuous function
Our next step is to reduce the problem of finding an end of a line to that of finding a Brouwer
fixed point. Here, we use a recent construction of a hard function by [Rub16], which improved
over the classic construction of Hirsch et al [HPV89].
We embed the points of the discrete graph G in the continuous space  1,2Θn. Specif-
ically, we embed each vertex v of G into a point xv in  1,2Θn and each edge v,w in
G into a (continuous) path in  1,2Θn that connects the corresponding points xv and xw.
Roughly speaking, [Rub16] shows that we can map a collection of lines in G into a Lipschitz
function f   1,2Θn    1,2Θn such that:
1. The computation of f can be done using local information about I. Namely, for points
that are close to xv it is sufficient to know Iv to compute f . For points that are
close to a path that corresponds to the edge v,w but far from the points xv,xw it is
sufficient to know whether v,w is an edge in the line (in particular, knowing either
Iu or Iv suffices). For points that are far from all paths v,w, f does not depend
on I at all (thus can be computed without any communication).
2. Any (normalized) Y Y2-approximate fixed point of f can be mapped (efficiently) back to
an end of some line in I.
Property 1 induces the following efficient communication protocol for computing fx:
Bob finds v such that x is close to xv, and sends βT,v, βS,v, βT,v; Alice replies with Iv  ŁαT,vβT,v, αT,vβT,v, αT,vβT,v, and they each use Iv to locally compute fx. (Sim-
ilarly, if x is close to the path corresponding to edge v,w, they use a similar protocol to
compute Iv and Iw.)
By Property 2, we have:
Corollary (CC(Brouwer); informal). Finding a (normalized) Y Y2-approximate fixed point
of f requires 2Ωn bits of communication.
Two-player game
Naively thinking, we would like to design a game where Alice chooses a point x >  1,2Θn
(on the ε-grid) and Bob chooses a point y >  1,2Θn (on the ε-grid). Alice’s utility will
be given by  Yx  yY22, and Bob’s utility will be given by4  Yy  fxY22. Then, by applying
4Note that here it is crucial that we use the normalized Y Y2 to obtain payoffs bounded in  9,0; using the
non-normalized Y Y2 we get payoffs in  
º
n,0.
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similar arguments to those in [Shm12, Bab14, Rub16] we can deduce that every approximate
Nash equilibrium corresponds to an approximate fixed point, and thus also to an end of a
line.
However, the above idea is obviously incorrect because Bob’s utility depends on f , whereas
in the communication problem his utility should depend on the βs only. Our key idea is to
use the fact that f can be computed locally to design a somewhat similar game where similar
phenomena to those in the “naive” game will occur in approximate equilibria.
Bob doesn’t know f , but to compute fx he should only know the local information
about the vertex (or vertices) that correspond to x. We incentivize Alice and Bob to combine
their private information about the corresponding vertex (or vertices) by the following utilities
structure.
 Alice’s first component of utility is given by  Yx  yY22. As in the “naive” game, in any
approximate Nash equilibrium Alice will play points in the -cube of the -grid that
contains E y with probability close to one.
 Bob tries to guess the vertex v (or the vertices v,w) that correspond to the point x. Since
x (almost always) belongs to the same -cube, in any (approximate) Nash equilibrium,
his guess should be correct (with high probability). In addition, Bob should announce
the β indexes βT , βS and βP of v (of v and w). Again, we incentivize him to do
so by defining that he should “guess” also these β indexes, and in an (approximate)
equilibrium his guess should be correct (w.h.p).
 We want Alice to announce Iv (similarly for w in case of two vertices). Thus, we
ask her to guess the decomposition αvBβB where vB and βB are the announced v
and β by Bob. In (approximate) equilibrium, since Bob announces the correct v and β
(w.h.p), this incentivizes her to announce the correct Iv (w.h.p).
 Now Bob uses the local information of Iv (and Iw) to compute f . Namely, his
last utility component is defined by  Zy  fIAv,IAwxZ22 where fIAv,IAw is Bob’s
“estimation” of f under the relevant local information announced by Alice. In (ap-
proximate) equilibrium Alice announces the correct local information (w.h.p), thus Bob
computes f correctly (w.h.p).
Summarizing, the (approximate) equilibrium analysis of the presented game is similar to
the analysis of the naive game, because in (approximate) equilibrium f is computed correctly
(w.h.p). But unlike the naive game, here Alice’s utility depends only on the αs and Bob’s
utility only on the βs.
n-player game: -WSNE
The n-player game reduction is based on the same ideas as the two-player reduction. For
clarity, we present first the idea of a reduction that proves the following weaker result:
There exists a constant  A 0 such that the communication complexity of -well supported
approximate Nash equilibrium in n-player games with constant number of actions for each
player is at least 2cn for some constant c.
After that, we explain how we can strengthen this result in two aspects: first to improve
the constant-number-of-action to binary-action, second to improve the -well supported Nash
equilibrium to , -weak approximate equilibrium.
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The idea is to replace a single player- Alice- who chooses x in the -grid of  1,2Θn by
a population of Θn players pxii>Θn; each player pxi in the population is responsible for
the ith coordinate of x. The payoff of player pxi is given by SxiyiS2. This incentivizes player
pxi to play either a single, or two adjacent actions, in the -grid of the segment  1,2 (in
every WSNE). By looking at the action profile of all pxi players we get the same phenomenon
as in the two-player case: every point x in the support of Alice’s players belongs to the same
-cube of the -grid.
Now, we replace the guess of v > 0,1Θn, that is done by Bob, by population of size
Θn where again each player is responsible to a single coordinate of v. Again in a WSNE
all players will guess correctly.
Similarly for the guess of β: we think of β >  M3 as an element of 0,13 logM and we
construct a population of 3 logM players, each controls a single bit.
Similarly for Alice’s guesses of IAv and IAv: we construct 6 players, each chooses a
bit.
Finally, we again replace the choice of y >  1,2Θn by a population of Θn players
pyi . Each is responsible to a single coordinate. The payoff of player pyi is given by Syi  fIAv,IAwxiS2. The analysis of this game is very similar to the two-player game analysis.
n-player game: , -Weak ANE and binary actions
In the above reduction, the x-type (and y-type players) have 3~ actions each. To construct
a binary action game we use the technique of [Bab14]. We replace each such player by a
population of 3~ players, each is located at a point in the -grid of the segment  1,2.
Player that is located at j >  1,2 (on the -grid) has to choose between the two points j or
j  . In a WSNE all players are located from the left of yi will choose j  , and all players
are located from the right of yi will choose j.
More tricky, is to generalize this reduction to weak approximate equilibria. Recall that in
weak approximate equilibria, a constant fraction of players may play an arbitrary suboptimal
action. Here we take into account both,
1. Players that are not -best replying, and
2. Players that are -best replying, but put small positive weight on the inferior action
(among the two) and the realization of their mixed action turned out to be the inferior
action.
In order to be immune from these, irrational, small constant fraction of players, we use error
correcting codes5. Let Eβ:0,13 logM   0,1Θ3 logM be a good binary error correcting
code. Instead of having a population of size 3 logM which tries to guess β, we replace it by
a population of size Θ3 logM where each player tries to guess his bit in the encoding of
β. Now even if a small constant fraction of players will act irrationally, the decoding of the
action profile of the β-type players will turn out to be β. We use the same idea for all types of
populations (x-type, y-type, v-type and I-type). This idea completes the reduction for weak
approximate equilibria.
5In fact, we use error correcting codes even earlier, in [Rub16]’s modification construction of hard Brouwer
function.
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3 Preliminaries
Notation We use 0n (respectively 1n) to denote the length-n vectors whose value is 0 (1)
in every coordinate. For vectors x,y > Rn, we let Yx  yY2 < ¼ 1n Pi> n xi  yi2 denote the
normalized 2-norm. Unless specified otherwise, when we say that x and y are ∆-close (or
∆-far), we mean ∆-close in normalized 2-norm.
3.1 Different notions of approximate Nash equilibrium
A mixed strategy of player i is a distribution xi over i’s set of actions, Ai. We say that a
vector of mixed strategies x > j∆Aj is a Nash equilibrium if every strategy ai in the support
of every xi is a best response to the actions of the mixed strategies of the rest of the players,
xi. Formally,
¦ai > supp xi Eaixi  ui ai, ai   max
a>Ai
Eaixi ui a, ai .
Equivalently, x is a Nash equilibrium if each mixed strategy xi is a best response to xi:
Eax  ui a   max
xi>∆Ai
Eaxi;xi
 ui a .
Each of those equivalent definitions can be generalized to include approximation in a
different way.
Definition 3.1 (-Approximate Nash Equilibrium). We say that x is an -Approximate Nash
Equilibrium (-ANE) if each xi is an -best response to xi:
Eax  ui a C max
x

i>∆Ai
Eaxi;xi
 ui a  .
On the other hand, we generalize the first definition of Nash equilibrium in the following
stricter definition:
Definition 3.2 (-Well-Supported Nash Equilibrium). x is a -Well-Supported Nash Equi-
librium (-WSNE) if every ai in the support of xi is an -best response to xi:
¦ai > supp xi Eaixi  ui ai, ai C max
a>Ai
Eaixi ui Ła , ai  .
WeakNash
We can further relax the (already more lenient) notion of -ANE by requiring that the -best
response condition only hold for most of the players (rather than all of them).
Definition 3.3 (, δ-WeakNash [BPR16]). We say that x is an , δ-WeakNash if for a1  δ-fraction of i’s, xi is an -best mixed response to xi:
Pr
i
<@@@@>Eax  ui a C maxxi>∆Ai Eaxi;xi  ui a  
=AAAA? C 1  δ.
9
3.2 WAPP and Conical Juntas
The class WAPP (Weak Almost-wide PP) was first introduced in [BGM06] in the context of
computational complexity. More recently, it has inspired the following models of query and
communication complexity:
Definition 3.4 (WAPP; [GLM15]). The WAPP {query / communication} complexity of a
problem is given by the minimum complexity6 of an {algorithm / protocol} that, for some
parameter γ   γn:
Completeness On all 1-instances, output 1 with probability >  1  γ, γ;
Soundness On all 0-instances, output 1 with probability >  0, γ.
For proving lower bounds against algorithms in the WAPP query model, we will use the
following observation due to Goos et al:
Lemma 3.5 (WAPP decision trees are conical juntas, [GLM15, Fact 29 of full version]).
Without loss of generality, for each outcome r of the randomness, the WAPP query algorithm
non-adaptively queries a single conjunction hr and returns the value of this conjunction.
3.3 Simulation Theorems
Let D  0,1N   0,1 be a decision problem. We consider the following query complexity
models. Each query is an index k >  N and the answer is the k-th bit of the input.
 The deterministic query complexity of D, denoted by PdtD.
 The WAPPδ query complexity of D, denoted by WAPP
dt
δ D.
We also consider the following communication complexity models. Here, for every k >  N
Alice holds a vector αk > 0,1M and Bob holds an index βk >  M, for some M   polyN.
Their goal is to compute D for the input α1β1, . . . , αNβN.
 The two-party deterministic communication complexity of the simulated problem D,
denoted by PccSim-D.
 The two-party WAPP communication complexity of the simulated problem D, denoted
by WAPPcc Sim-D.
 The (more standard) bounded error two-party probabilistic communication complexity
of the simulated problem D, denoted by BPPccSim-D.
It is easy to see that for any constant δ and problem D,
BPPccSim-D   Ω WAPPccδ Sim-D .
To “lift” from query complexity hardness to communication complexity, we use the fol-
lowing simulation theorem for WAPP, due to Goos et al [GLM15].
6Public-coin communication protocols also incur an additional penalty of log1~γ.
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Theorem 3.6 (WAPP Simulation Theorem, [GLM15, Theorem 2]7). There exists
M   polyN such that for any constants 0 @  @ δ @ 1~2, WAPPcc Sim-D  
Ω WAPPdtδ DlogN.
For ease of presentation, let us also mention the following simulation theorem for deter-
ministic algorithms/protocols; it is due to Goos et al [GPW15], which in turn is based on the
work of Raz and McKenzie [RM97].
Theorem 3.7 (Deterministic Simulation Theorem, [GPW15]). There exists M   polyN
such that PccSim-D   Θ PdtDlogN.
4 Proofs
In Section 4.1 we prove a deterministic query lower bound for (a special case of) the end-of-
any-line problem. In Section 4.2 we prove a query lower bound for the end-of-any-line problem
in the WAPP model. In Section 4.3 we show how the lower bounds of Sections 4.1 and 4.2
can be “lifted” to get a hard problem in the deterministic and randomized (respectively)
communication complexity models. We note that the communicationally hard problem is the
same problem for the deterministic and the randomized models. Obviously, the randomized
communication complexity result is stronger. Nevertheless, we present here the proof of both
results because the deterministic model is easier to follow.
In Sections 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 we reduce the communicationally hard end-of-any-line problem
to the approximate Nash equilibrium problem. We note that this reduction holds for both
the deterministic and randomized communication complexity models.
4.1 A deterministic query complexity lower bound
Let G be a directed graph with the vertices V   0,1n0,1n n1. Each vertex v1, v2, k,
where v1, v2 > 0,1n and k >  n, has two outgoing edges to the vertices v1, vk12 0, k1 andv1, vk12 1, k  1, where vj0   v1, . . . , vj1,0, vj1, . . . , vn. We call v1, vk12 0, k  1 the
0-successor of v, and v1, vk12 1, k1 the 1-successor of v. Each vertex v   v1, v2, n1 has
a single outgoing edge to the vertex v2, v1,0. Note that the incoming degree of each vertex
v   v1, v2, k > V is at most two. For k   1 there is a single incoming edge from v2, v1, n1.
For k A 1 there are two incoming edges from v1, vk20, k  1 and from v1, vk21, k  1. We
call v1, vk20, k  1 the 0-predecessor of v, and v1, vk21, k  1 the 1-predecessor of v.
We define the Query End-of-the-Line (Query-EotL) to be the problem of finding the
end of a line in G that starts at the point 02n1. More formally, we represent a line in G by a
triple Iv < T v, Sv, P v where T v > 0,1 indicates whether the line goes through
v, Sv > 0,1 indicates who is the successor of v, and P v > 0,1 indicates who is the
predecessor of v (here we use the fact that each vertex has outgoing and incoming degree of
at most two). Throughout the paper, we slightly abuse notation and use Sv/P v to refer
both to the bits, and to the corresponding vertices (i.e. the Sv/P v-successor/predecessor
of v). The end of the line is the vertex v such that T v   1 but T Sv   0.
Definition 4.1. The problem Query-EotL is given by
Input: A line I   T,S,P  over the graph G that starts at the point 02n1.
7The statement in [GLM15] is in fact stronger in the sense that rather than giving Bob a pointer βi to
an arbitrary vector αi held by Alice, it suffices to use a simpler and more compact inner-product gadget.
Furthermore, the inner product gadget can be replaced by any two-source extractor.
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Output: The first bit ( v1) of the end of the line vertex.
Queries: Each query is a vertex v > V . The answer is the triplet of bits Iv  T v, Sv, P v > 0,13.
Lemma 4.2 (Deterministic query complexity). PdtQuery-EotL   Ω2n.
Proof. We choose a permutation pi over 0,1n0n uniformly at random, and set pi0 < 0n.
pi induces a line of length Θ 2n   n over G, starting at 02n1, ending at pi2n1, pi2n1,0,
and where where two consecutive vertices v   pii and w   pii1 are mapped to the following
line of n  1 edges:
v, v,0         v, w 1,k, v k1,n, k         v,w,n  w,w,0. (1)
Here w 1,k, v k1,n denotes the vector with first k coordinates as in w and the last n  k
coordinates as in v.
The information of a single query of Query-EotL (for the above class of lines) can be
extracted from pii  1, pii and pii  1. Therefore Query-EotL is at least as hard as
the problem of finding the first bit of the last element in a random permutation, where each
query returns the previous, the current, and the next vertices. Conditioning on the answers
to k queries piq1  1, piq1, piq1  1, . . . , piqk  1, piqk, piqk  1, the last element of the
permutation is still uniformly random across all vertices that are not piq1, . . . , piqk, piq1 
1, . . . , piqk  1, piq1  1, . . . , piqk  1. This proves that the latter problem requires Ω2n
queries.
4.2 A stronger (WAPP) query complexity lower bound
We consider the same graph G over Θ 2n   n vertices described earlier. But now we construct
either one line as before, or two vertex-disjoint lines, one of which again starts at the point
02n1, and the other at an arbitrary point. The goal is to find an end or starting point of
either line, other than the trivial solution 02n1. More precisely, we will consider instances
that satisfy the promise that all non-trivial end and starting points have the same first bit,
and the algorithm is expected to return this bit.
We call our new problem the Query End-of-any-Line (Query-EoaL) to be the prob-
lem of finding a non-trivial end end of a line. More formally, we represent a collection of
(at most two) lines in G by a triple Iv < T v, Sv, P v where T v > 0,1 indi-
cates whether a line goes through v, Sv > 0,1 indicates who is the successor of v, and
P v > 0,1 indicates who is the predecessor of v (here we use the fact that each vertex has
outgoing and incoming degree of at most two). At the end of each line there is a vertex v
such that T v   1 but T Sv   0. Similarly, at the beginning of each line, there is a
vertex v such that T v   1 but T P v   0 (where for one line v   02n1).
Definition 4.3. The problem Query-EoaL is given by
Input: A collection of vertex-disjoint lines I   T,S,P  over the graph G, one of which starts
at the point 02n1.
Output: The first bit ( v1) of any end or starting vertex v x 02n1. (We will only consider
instances where this first bit is the same for all v x 02n1.)
Queries: Each query is a vertex v > V . The answer is the triplet of bits Iv  T v, Sv, P v > 0,13.
(Notice that Query-EoaL is a generalization of Query-EotL.)
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Lemma 4.4 (WAPP query complexity). WAPPdt0.1Query-EoaL   Ω2n.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that there is a WAPP0.1 algorithm with query complexity
o2n. We assume without loss of generality, that whenever the algorithm queries a vertex
of the form v, w 1,k, v k1,n, k (for some v,w > 0,1n and k > 0, . . . , n), it also tests
whether v, v,0 is the end of a line by querying v, v,0 and Sv, v,0 (note that this only
incurs a constant blowup in the query complexity).
By Lemma 3.5, we can also assume without loss of generality that the algorithm takes the
following form: For each random string r, it non-adaptively queries I on a subset U r ` V of
size SU S   o2n and compares it to a guess Iru for each u > U . It returns 1 if and only if
Iru   Iu for all u > U r. Let Cr, I denote the function that takes a random string r and
a collection of vertex-disjiont lines I and outputs a bit in 0,1 as above. As we mentioned
above, we require that if v, w 1,k, v k1,n, k > U r, then so are v, v,0 and Sv, v,0.
We consider inputs drawn from three distributions:
 X: Draw a permutation pi over 0,1n  0n uniformly at random conditioning on the
first bit of the last vertex satisfying pi2n  1
1
  1. Set pi0 < 0n, and let I be the
line induced from pi, starting at 02n1, ending at pi2n  1, pi2n  1,0, and defined
as in (1).
 Y : Draw pi as in X. “Cut” pi into two by picking a random pair8 u,w of consecutive
vertices in pi whose first bits are both 1, and disconnecting them. I.e. we now let
I represent two lines: one from 02n1 to u,u,0, and the other from w,w,0 topi2n  1, pi2n  1,0. (Where each line is again defined according to (1).)
 Z: Draw pi conditioning on the first bit of the last vertex satisfying pi2n1
1
  0. Let
I be the line induced from pi, starting at 02n1 and ending at pi2n  1, pi2n  1,0.
By the requirement from the WAPP0.1 algorithm, we must have that for some γ A 0,
Pr
r
Pr
IX
 Cr, I   1 >  0.9γ, γ (2)
Pr
r
Pr
IY
 Cr, I   1 >  0.9γ, γ (3)
Pr
r
Pr
IZ
 Cr, I   1 >  0,0.1γ. (4)
For each i   0,1, . . . , let Ai denote the set of r’s such that I
r expects to observe i ends of
lines. I.e. for i distinct v1, . . . , vi > 0,1n, T rvj , vj ,0   1 and T rSrvj , vj ,0   0.
First observe that for i C 2, random strings in Ai do not contribute at all to (2) because
I never agrees with Ir. We therefore have:
Pr
r
Pr
IX
 Cr, I   1   Pr
r
Pr
IX
 Cr, I   1 AND r > A0  Pr
r
Pr
IX
 Cr, I   1 AND r > A1. (5)
Now, for A0, after observing o2n queries U r, Ir, one has only a negligible advantage
at distinguishing between X and Z (see also proof of Lemma 4.4). Therefore,
Pr
r
Pr
IZ
 Cr, I   1 AND r > A0 C 1  o1Pr
r
Pr
IX
 Cr, I   1 AND r > A0. (6)
8We condition on such a pair being present. With high probability there are Ω2n such pairs, even after
any fixing of o2n positions of the permutation.
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Similarly, for A1, I
r has almost double the chance of agreeing with I  Y than I X since
with o2n queries it’s impossible to distinguish between the end of the line starting at 02n1
and the end of the spurious line. (Ir may expect to observe the second starting point, but
that also does not contribute to (2).) We therefore have,
Pr
r
Pr
IY
 Cr, I   1 AND r > A1 C 2  o1Pr
r
Pr
IX
 Cr, I   1 AND r > A1. (7)
Plugging (6) and (7) into (5) we have that,
2 Pr
r
Pr
IZ
 Cr, I   1  Pr
r
Pr
IY
 Cr, I   1 C 2  o1Pr
r
Pr
IX
 Cr, I   1
C 1.7γ (Ineq. (2)),
which is a contradiction to the (weighted) sum of (3) and (4).
4.3 Communicationally hard, discrete end-of-any-line problem
In order to use a simulation theorem (Theorem 3.7 for deterministic and Theorem 3.6 for
randomized communication complexity), we define the following simulation variant of Query-
EoaL:
Definition 4.5 (Sim-EoaL). We let N   2n   2n   n  1   3.
Input: For each v > 0,1n0,1n n1, Alice receives three vectors αTv , αSv , αPv > 0,1M ,
and Bob receives three indices βTv , β
S
v , β
P
v >  M.
We define
T v   αTv βTv , Sv   αSv βSv , and P v   αPv βPv . (8)
We simulate the problem Query-EoaL, therefore we restrict attention to inputs such
that T,S,P  that are defined in (8) meet all the requirements of Query-EoaL.
Output: The first bit ( v1) of a non-trivial end or start of a line v, v,0 x 02n1.
Applying the deterministic Simulation Theorem (Theorem 3.7) to the query complexity
lower bound (Lemma 4.2) gives a lower bound on the deterministic communication complexity
of a discrete end of line problem Sim-EoaL.
Corollary 4.6. Pcc Sim-EoaL   Ω 2n.
Applying the randomized WAPP Simulation Theorem (Theorem 3.6) to the query com-
plexity lower bound (Lemma 4.4) gives a stronger lower bound on the randomized communi-
cation complexity of a discrete end of line problem Sim-EoaL.
Corollary 4.7. BPPcc Sim-EoaL   Ω WAPPcc0.01 Sim-EoaL   Ω 2n.
4.4 Embedding a line as a local Lipschitz function
It will be more convenient to define G as a graph over 0,12nlogn1.
Let m   Θ2n  logn  1   Θ n and let E0,12nlogn1   0,1m denote the
encoding function of a good binary error correcting code. We embed the discrete graph G
into the continuous cube  1,24m.
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The vertex v is embedded to the point Ev,Ev,0m,0m >  1,24m, which is called
the embedded vertex.
For two vertices v,w > V such that v,w is an edge in the graph G, we define five vertices:
x1v,w < Ev,Ev,0m,0m
x2v,w < Ev,Ev,1m,0m
x3v,w < Ev,Ew,1m,0m
x4v,w < Ev,Ew,0m,0m
x5v,w < Ew,Ew,0m,0m .
Note that x1v,w is the embedded vertex v, x5v,w is the embedded vertex w.
The line that connects the points xiv,w and xi1v,w is called a Brouwer line segment.
The union of these four Brouwer line segments is called the embedded edge v,w. It is not
hard to check that non-consecutive Brouwer line segments are Ω1-far one from the other,
and in particular it implies that non-consecutive embedded edges are sufficiently far one from
the other.
The following Proposition shows that the end-of-any-line problem can be reduced to the
problem of finding an approximate fixed point of a continuous Lipschitz function, when the
function is “local” in the following sense: every edge in G is embedded as a path in the
continuous hypercube (as described above). For points close to the embedding of an edge,
f depends only on the “local behaviour” of the lines I at the endpoints of this edge; for all
other points, f is independent of the lines I.
Proposition 4.8 (Essentially [Rub16]). There exist constants δ, h A 0 such that given a line
I   T,S,P  over G there exists a function f   fI    1,24m    1,24m with the following
properties:
1. Yfx  xY2 A δ for every x that in not h-close to the embedded edge of any non-trivial
end or start of a line (i.e., the embedding of the edge P v, v such that T v   1
but T Sv   0; or the edge v, Sv for v such that T P v   0, T v   1,
and v x 02n1).
2. f is O1-Lipschitz in Y Y2 norm.
3. f is local in the sense that it can be defined as an interpolation between a few (in fact,
64) functions, fI1,I2   1,24m    1,24mIi>0,13, that do not depend on the lines I
and such that:
(a) If the first m-tuple of coordinates of x is 6h-close to the encoded vertex Ev, but
the second m-tuple of coordinates of x is 6h-far from any encoded vertex Ew
then fIv,I2x   fx for every I2 > 0,13.
(b) If the second m-tuple of coordinates of x is 6h-close to the encoded vertex Ew,
but the first m-tuple of coordinates of x is 6h-far from any encoded vertex Ev
then fI1,Iwx   fx for every I1 > 0,13.
(c) If the first m-tuple of coordinates of x is 6h-close to the encoded vertex Ev, and
the second m-tuple of coordinates of x is 6h-close to the encoded vertex Ew then
fIv,Iwx   fx.
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(d) If none of the above conditions are satisfied, then fI1,I2x   fx for every I1, I2 >0,13.
A very similar proposition was recently proved in [Rub16]. Property (3) in Proposition 4.8
differs a little from the way “locality” is formalized in [Rub16], but it is an immediate con-
sequence of the construction. For completeness, we present the proof of Proposition 4.8 in
Appendix A.
4.5 Two-Player game
Theorem (Theorem 2.1, restated). There exists a constant  A 0 such that the communication
complexity of -Nash equilibrium in two-player N N games is at least N .
We construct a two-player game between Alice and Bob of size NA NB for
NA < 3~4m   23   2Θn
NB < 3~4m   22nlogn12  M3   2Θn.
such that Alice’s utility depends on αTv , αSv , αPv v only, Bob’s utility depends on βTv , βSv , βPv v
only, and all 4-approximate Nash equilibria of the game correspond to a δ-fixed point of f
from Proposition 4.8. By property 1 in Proposition 4.8, any fixed point of f corresponds to
a non-trivial end or start of a line in I.
4.5.1 The game
In this subsection we construct our reduction from Sim-EoaL to the problem of finding an
-WSNE.
Strategies
Recall that δ is the desired approximation parameter for Brouwer fixed point in the construc-
tion of Proposition 4.8. We let  be a sufficiently small constant; in particular,    Oδ (this
will be important later for Inequality (17)).
Each of Alice’s actions corresponds to an ordered tuple x, IAv , IAw , where:
 x >  1,24m, where the interval  1,2 is discretized into 1,1  , . . . ,2  ,2;
 IAv < tAv , sAv , pAv  > 0,13 and IAw < tAw, sAw, pAw > 0,13.
Each of Bob’s actions corresponds to an ordered tuple y, vB,wB, βBv , βBw , where:
 y >  1,24m, where the interval  1,2 is discretized into 1,1  , . . . ,2  ,2;
 vB,wB > 0,12nlogn1 are vertices in the graph G.
 βBv   βB,Tv , βB,Sv , βB,Pv  >  M3 and βBw   βB,Tw , βB,Sw , βB,Pw  >  M3 are triples of in-
dexes.
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Utilities
Alice’s and Bob’s utilities decompose as
UA < UAImitation U
A
GuessV U
A
GuessW.
UB < UBBrouwer U
B
GuessV U
B
GuessW.
The first component of Alice’s utility depends only on the first components of her and Bob’s
strategies; it is given by:
UAimitation x;y <  Yx  yY22 .
Given the first component x >  1,24m of Alice’s strategy, we define two decoding functions
Dv,Dw   1,24m   0,1n as follows. Let Rv x > 0,1m be the rounding of the first
m-tuple of coordinates of x to 0,1m; let Dvx   E1Rvx > 0,12nlogn1, where
E1 denote the decoding of the error correcting code from Section 4.4. We define Dw x >0,12nlogn1 analogously with respect to the second m-tuple of coordinates of x. The
second components of Bob’s utility is now given by UBGuessV   1 iff he guesses correctly the
vertex Dvx, and the corresponding β operation on this vertex. Namely,
UBGuessVvB, βBv ;x   ¢¨¨¦¨¨¤
1 if vB  Dvx and βBv   βTDvx, βSDvx, βPDvx
0 otherwise.
Similarly we define Bob’s third component UBGuessW with respect to Dwx.
Note that Bob knows the indexes βTv , β
S
v , β
P
v (for every v), thus to achieve U
B
Guess   1
Bob needs to guess correctly only the vertices Dvx,Dwx and announce the corresponding
triplet of β indexes.
Going back to Alice, the second component of her utility is given by UAGuessV   1 iff she
guesses correctly the triplet IvB   T vB, SvB, P vB when the calculation of T,S,P
is done by the decomposition of αβB. Namely,
UAGuessVIAv ; vB, βB   ¢¨¨¦¨¨¤
1 if IAv   αTvBβB,Tv , αSvBβB,Sv , αPvBβB,Pv 
0 otherwise.
Similarly we define Alice’s third component UBGuessW.
Finally, the first component of Bob’s utility is given by:
UBBrouwery;x, eA <  ZfIAv ,IAw x  yZ22 .
where the function fI1,I2 is defined in Proposition 4.8.
4.5.2 Analysis of game
In this subsection, we prove the reduction from Sim-EoaL to finding an 4-ANE. The proof
proceeds via a sequence of lemmas that establish the structure of any 4-ANE.
Lemma 4.9. In every 4-ANE A;B, it holds that Yx  EyB yY22   O 2 with probability
of at least 1  2 (where the probability is taken over A).
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Proof. We denote Ei B   EyB  yi, E B   E1 B , . . . ,En B is the vector of expectations,
and Var B   VaryB  y1 , . . . ,VaryB  yn is the vector of variances. For every x we can
rewrite
UAimitation x,B   EyB Yx  yY22
  
1
4m
Q
i> 4m
EyB xi  yi2
  
1
4m
Q
i> 4m
xi  yiB2  VaryB  yi
   Yx  E BY22  YVar BY22 .
(9)
Since the variance of the yi’s, as well as U
A
GuessV and U
A
GuessW, do not depend on x, Alice’s
best response to B is
x    E1 B , . . . ,  En B
where    denotes the rounding to the closest  integer multiplication. x yields a payoff of
at least
UAimitation x,B C 24  YVar BY22 .
Note that in every 4-ANE Alice assigns a probability of at most 1  2 to actions that are
2-far from optimal. By Equation (9) this implies that the probability of Alice to choose a
vector x that satisfies Yx  E BY22 C 2  24 is at most 2.
Lemma 4.10. In every 4-ANE A;B, if the first m-tuple of coordinates of EyB  y is
6h-close to the binary encoding Ev of a vertex v, then
vB   v, and βBv   βTv , βSv , βPv  (10)
with probability of at least 1 O4 (where the probability is taken over B).
Proof. By Lemma 4.9 and the triangle inequality, with probability of at least 1  2, the first
m-tuple of x is O h-close to Ev. Rounding to Rv x > 0,1m can at most double the
distance to Ev in each coordinate. Therefore, the Hamming distance of Rv x and Ev
is O h. Hence Rv x is correctly decoded as Dv x   v, with probability of at least 1  2.
Since vB, βBv do not affect U
B
Brouwer  U
B
GuessW, Bob’s utility from guessing v
B
  v, and
βBv   βTv , βSv , βPv  is at least 1  2. Whereas his utility from guessing any other guess is at
most 2. Therefore, Bob assigns probability at least 1  4~1  22 to actions that satisfy
(10).
A similar lemma holds for the second m-tuple of x and the vertex w:
Lemma 4.11. In every 4-ANE A;B, if the second m-tuple of coordinates of EyB  y is
6h-close to the binary encoding EW  of a vertex w, then
wB   w, and βBw   βTw , βSw, βPw 
with probability of at least 1 O4 (where the probability is taken over B).
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Since Alice receives the correct vB and βB, we also have:
Lemma 4.12. In every 4-ANE A;B, if the first m-tuple of coordinates of EyB  y is
6h-close to the binary encoding Ev of a vertex v, then
IAv   αTv βTv , αSv βSv , αPv βPv 
with probability 1 O4 (where the probability is taken over A and B).
Proof. Follows immediately from Lemma 4.10 and the fact that IAv does not affect U
A
Imitation
UAGuessW.
A similar lemma holds for the second m-tuple of x and the vertex w:
Lemma 4.13. In every 4-ANE A;B, if the second m-tuple of coordinates of EyB  y is
6h-close to the binary encoding EW  of a vertex w, then
IAw   αTwβTw, αSwβSw, αPwβPw 
with probability 1 O4 (where the probability is taken over A and B).
Lemma 4.14. In every 4-ANE A;B, fIAv ,IAw x   f x with probability 1 O2.
Proof. Follows immediately from Lemmas 4.12 and 4.13 and the “locality” condition in Propo-
sition 4.8.
The following corollary completes the analysis of the 2-player game.
Corollary 4.15. In every 4-ANE A;B, YExA x  fExA xY2 @ δ.
Proof. We recall that in Lemma 4.9 we have proved that
Yx  EyB yY22   O2 (11)
with probability 1  O2. This also implies that x is, with high probability, close to its
expectation:
Zx  ExA xZ22 B Yx  EyB yY2  ZExA x  EyB yZ2 
2
(Triangle ineqaultiy)
B 2 Yx  EyB yY22  2 ZExA x  EyB yZ22 (AM-GM ineqaultiy)
B 2 Yx  EyB yY22  2ExA Zx  EyB yZ22 (Convexity of Y Y22)
  O2, (Lemma 4.9) (12)
with probability 1 O2.
Using that f is O1-Lipschitz together with Equation (12), we get that
Zfx  fExA xZ22   O2 (13)
with probability 1 O2.
By Lemma 4.14 we know that fIAv ,IAw x   fx with probability 1O2, which implies
that
ZExA fIAv ,IAw x  ExA fxZ22   O2. (14)
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Using similar arguments to those of Lemma 4.9 we can show that
Zy  ExA fIAv ,IAw xZ22   O2 (15)
with probability 1 O2. As in the derivation of Equation (12), this implies:
Zy  EyB yZ22   O2 (16)
with probability 1 O2.
With probability 1 O2 Inequalities (12),(11),(16),(15),(14),(13) hold simultaneously.
In such a case, by the triangle inequality and by applying the inequalities in the exact above
order, we have
ZExA x  fExA xZ22   O2 @ δ2. (17)
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Any communication protocol that solves the 4-Nash equilibrium prob-
lem in games of size N N for N   2Θn induces a communication protocol for the problem
Sim-EoaL: Alice constructs her utility in the above presented game using her private infor-
mation of the αs, Bob constructs his utility using the βs. They implement the communication
protocol to find an 4-Nash equilibrium, and then both of them know ExA x which is a δ-
approximate fixed point of f (by Corollary 4.15). Using Dv they decode the vertex v
 and
they know the first coordinate of v.
Using Corollary 4.7 we deduce that the communication complexity of 4-Nash equilibrium
in games of size 2Θn  2Θn is at least 2Ωn.
4.6 n-player game
Theorem (Theorem 2.2, restated). There exists a constant  A 0 such that the communication
complexity of , -weak approximate Nash equilibrium in n-player binary-action games is at
least 2n.
The proof follows similar lines to those in the proof of Theorem 2.1. Rather than two
players whose actions correspond to Θn-long vectors, we have a player for each bit of (an
encoding of) those vectors. We construct a game with 8m-players for m   Θn such that
Alice holds the utility function of (the first) 3m players, Bob holds the utilities of (the last)
5m players, Alice’s players utilities depend only on the αs, Bob’s utilities depend only on
the βs, and every 5~82, 5~82-weak approximate Nash equilibrium corresponds to a δ-fixed
point of the function f from Proposition 4.8.
Players and Actions
In section 4.5 we have used error correcting code to encode vertices that are deduced from
x and y. Here, since we consider weak approximate equilibria, we should add additional
encodings for IAv , I
A
v , v
B,wB, βBv and β
B
w . Since we want to use the same number of players
for each of the above objects, it will be convenient to encode them in the same space 0,1m .
We let the following be encoding functions of binary error correcting codes with constant
(relative) distance:
 EI  0,13   0,1m .
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 Eu  0,12nlogn1   0,1m .
 Eβ  0,13 logM   0,1m (note that 3 logM   Θn).
Let E and m denote encoding function and block length of the error correcting code from
Section 4.4, i.e.:
 E  0,12nlogn1   0,1m.
For vectors x,y >  1,24m, we use 3  1 bits to encode each continuous coordinate (up
to precision ) in unary encoding. We choose m such that m   43  1m, so the encoding
of each of x,y also takes m bits. (For Eβ, we must also have m

A 3 logM .) Here and
henceforth,  is a sufficiently small constant, satisfying    Θδ.
Instead of having a single player, Alice, with actions x, IAv , IAw  > 1,1, . . . ,2,2m0,13  0,13 we replace her by 3m players with binary actions. We have three types of
Alice players:
 x-type players. Player xij chooses one of the actions a
i
j > j, j   for every i >  4m
and j > 1,1  , . . . ,2  2,2  . Note that the total number of x-type players is
4m3  1  m.
 Iv-type and Iw-type players. Player Ivi chooses a bit 0 or 1 for every i >  m. Similarly
for Iw-type players.
In the communication problem, we assume that Alice knows the utilities of all the above
players.
Instead of having a single player, Bob, with actions y, vB,wB, βBv , βBw  > 1,1, . . . ,2
,2m  0,12nlogn1  0,12nlogn1   M3   M3 we replace him by 5m players with
binary actions. We have five types of players:
 y-type players. Player yij chooses one of the actions b
i
j > j, j   for every i >  4m and
j > 1,1  , . . . ,2  2,2  .
 v-type players. Player vi chooses a bit 0 or 1 for every i >  m. Similarly for w-type
players.
 βv-type players. Player βvi chooses a bit 0 or 1 for every i >  m. Similarly for βw-type
players.
In the communication problem, we assume that Bob knows the utilities of all the above
players.
Utilities
Before getting to the description of the utilities we define the notions of realized number and
realized point by a set of players. For every i >  m, for simplicity of notations we add a dummy
player xi2 who has a single action a
i
2   2. Given an action profile a
i
  ai
1, a
i
1, . . . , a
i
2 of
the players xijj , the realized number rai >  1,2 is defined to be the minimal j such that
aij   j. Note that rai is well defined because the last player xi2 plays 2. Given an action
profile a   aiji,j of all x-type players we denote by ra   raii >  1,2m the realized
point. Similarly we define the realized point of y-type players.
The utilities are defined similarly to the two-player case with the following differences:
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1. x-type/ y-type players’ utilities are defined with respect to the realized points of the
opponents. In addition, player that is responsible to the i-th coordinate of the point
pays the distance from the i-th coordinate of the opponent’s point/the ith coordinate
of the f operation of the opponent’s point.
2. For all other types, the i-th player chooses the value of the i-th bit in the (alleged)
codeword in 0,1m .
Formally the payoffs are defined as follows:
 For x-type players, Ux
i
j aij ; bi < Saij  rbiS2, where we recall that player xij is allowed
to choose only ai,j   j or ai,j   j  , and b
i is the profile of action played by playersyijj .
 For a v-type player vi, we define U
vi vi;a   1 iff he announces the bit  EuDvrai
(where the decoding function Dv is defined in Section 4.5.1). Otherwise, U
vi vi;a   0.
Namely, the i-th player tries to guess the i-th coordinate of the encoded vector Euv >0,1m , were v is computed using the decoding operation Dv on the realized point
ra >  1,24m. Similarly we define the utility of a w-type player.
 For a βv-type player βvi , we define U
βvi βvi ;a   1 iff he announces the bit EββSDvrai. Namely, the i-th player tries to guess the i-th coordinate of the en-
coded vector EββSv , were v, as in the previous bullet, is computed using decoding.
Similarly we define the utilities of βw-type players.
 For a Iv-type player Ivi , we define U
Ivi Ivi , βv   1 iff she announces the bitEu αTv  β1, αSv  β2, αPv  β3i where v is the decoded vertex announced by v-
type players and β is the decoded vector of indexes announced by βv-type players.
Similarly we define the utilities of Iw-type players.
 For y-type players, Uyij
  Sbij  fIv ,IwraS2, where Iv and Iw are the decoding of the
vertices announced by Iv-type and Iw-type players. We recall that the function fIv ,Iw
is defined in Proposition 4.8.
4.6.1 Analysis of game
We analyse , -weak approximate equilibria for    5~82. The analysis of the game follows
the same sequence of Lemmas as the analysis in the two-player case (Section 4.5.2). The
analogue of Lemma 4.9 is the following.
Lemma 4.16. In every , -weak approximate equilibrium A,B, the realized point by the
x-type players ra satisfies
Yra  EbB rbY22 B 2 (18)
with high probability9 (the probability is over the mixed strategy of the x-type players).
9Here and throughout this section, we use “with high probability” to mean with probability approaching
1 as n grows (in fact, with an exponential dependence); in particular, the probability is approaching 1 faster
than any polynomial in .
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Proof. We say that player xij ’s action j is wrong if EbiB rbi C j  ; similarly, we say that
action j   is wrong EbiB rbi B j. Note that if for some coordinate i, no player xij plays a
wrong action, then the realized number riai is -close to EbiB rbi. We show that indeed
in an , -weak approximate equilibrium we will have many such coordinates i.
Recall that player xij ’s utility when she plays j is given by
uj < EbiB Uxij j; bi   EbiB Sj  rbiS2   Sj  EbiB rbiS2  VarbiB rbi.
Similarly, when she plays j   her utility is given by
uj   < EbiB Uxij j  ; bi   EbiB Sj    rbiS2   Sj    EbiB rbiS2  VarbiB rbi.
When j is wrong (i.e. EbiB rbi C j  ) the difference in the utilities uj  uj is given
by
uj    uj   EbiB rbi  j  2  EbiB rbi  j2
  2EbiB rbi  2j   C 2
For j   is wrong (EbiB rbi B j) the difference in the utilities uj  uj   is given by
uj  uj     j  EbiB rbi2  j    EbiB rbi2
  2j  2EbiB rbi   C 2
Therefore, player xij can always increase her payoff by at least 
2 by deviating from a wrong
action. Note that if player xij is -best replying, she assigns a probability of at most ~2 to
a wrong action. In addition, the fraction of x-type players that are not -best replying is at
most 8 (because we have 8 types of players of equal cardinality). Therefore, in the expected
fraction of x-type players playing a wrong is at most 8  2~2 @ 2.5~2. Therefore, with
high probability over x-type players mixed strategies, at most a 3~2-fraction play a wrong
action (e.g. by Chernoff bound). Therefore the fraction of coordinates i >  4m where at
least one player xij plays a wrong action is at most 9~3 (because we have 3~ players in each
coordinate). So in 1 9~3 fraction of coordinates we have SriaiEbiB rbiS B , which
implies
Yra  EbB rbY22   14mQi Srai  EbB rbiS2 B 1 
9
3
2  9
3
32 @
82
3
  2
The analogue of Lemma 4.10 is the following.
Lemma 4.17. In every , -weak approximate equilibrium A,B, if the first m-tuple of
coordinates of EbB rb is 6h-close to the binary encoding E v of a vertex v, then
1. The decoding of the action profile of the v-type players is v with probability 1  o.
2. The decoding of the action profile of the βv-type players is βTv , βSv , βPv  with probability
1  o.
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Proof. Whenever (18) holds, Dvra   v. In particular, for each i >  m,  EuDvrai   Euvi with high probability. Therefore, by playing the action  Euvi player vi has ex-
pected utility of 1  o1 whereas by playing the action 1   Euvi his expected utility is
o1.
Every player that is -best replying, assigns probability of at least 1O to the correct
bit. In addition, we have at most 8 fraction of v-type players who are not -best replying
(because we have 8 types of players of equal cardinality). Therefore the expected fraction of
v-type players who play the wrong bit is O. By Chernoff bound, it also holds that with
high probability at most an O-fraction of v-type players play the wrong bit. Whenever
this is the case, v is indeed decoded correctly.
Similarly we prove the second claim in the lemma for βv-type players.
In a similar way we can show that analogues of Lemmas 4.11, 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14 hold
for the n-player game. In particular,
Lemma 4.18. In every , -weak approximate equilibrium A,B, fIAv ,IAw x   f x with
high probability.
Now we get to the analogue of the last Corollary 4.15.
Corollary 4.19. In every , -weak approximate equilibrium A,B, the expectation of the
realized point EaA ra is a δ-approximate equilibrium of f ; i.e.,
YEaA ra  fEaA raY2 B δ.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Corollary 4.15. We recall that in Lemma 4.16 we
have proved that
Yra  EbB rbY22 B 2 (19)
with high probability. This, in particular, implies that ra is, with high probability, close to
its expectation:
Zra  EaA raZ22 B 2 Yra  EbB rbY22  2 YEaA ra  EbB rbY22 (Triangle ineq.)
B 2 Yra  EbB rbY22  2EaA Zra  EbB rbZ22 (Convexity)
  O2, (Lemma 4.16)
(20)
with high probability.
Using the O1-Lipschitzness of f we deduce that
Zfra  fEaA raZ22   O2 (21)
with high probability.
Using similar arguments to those of Lemma 4.16 we can show that
[rb  EaA fIv ,Iwra[22   O2 (22)
with high probability, where we recall that Iv, Iw denote the decoded line information of the
action profile played by the Iv, Iw-types players. By an analogous argument to (20),
Zrb  EbB rbZ22   O2 (23)
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with high probability.
By Lemma 4.18,
[EaA fIv ,Iwra  EaA fra[22   O2. (24)
By Equations (20),(19),(23),(22),(24),(21) (applied exactly in this order) and the triangle
inequality we get
ZEaA ra  fEaA raZ22   O2 @ δ2. (25)
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Any communication protocol that solves the 5~82, 5~82-weak ap-
proximate Nash equilibrium problem in Θn-player games with binary actions induces a
communication protocol for the problem Sim-EoaL: Alice constructs the utilities of her play-
ers using her private information of the αs, Bob constructs his utility using the βs. They
implement the communication protocol to find an 5~82, 5~82-weak approximate Nash equi-
librium, and then both of them know EaA ra which is a δ-approximate fixed point of f
(by Corollary 4.19). Finally, they round and decode the approximate fixed point to get an
end or start of a line.
Using Corollary 4.7 we deduce that the communication complexity of 5~82, 5~82-weak
approximate Nash equilibrium problem in Θn-player games with binary actions is at least
2Ωn.
5 An Open Problem: Correlated Equilibria in 2-Player Games
As mentioned in Section 1.3, it is known that for n-player, O1-action games, even exact
correlated equilibrium can be found with polyn deterministic communication complexity
(see [HM10, PR08, JLB15]).
For approximate correlated equilibrium in two-player N  N games, to the best of our
knowledge, no non-trivial results are known (neither positive nor negative). Does a polylogN
communication protocol for approximate correlated equilibrium exist? Is there a polyN
communication lower bound?
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A Proof of Proposition 4.8
Proposition (Proposition 4.8, restated). There exist constants10 δ, h A 0 such that given a
line I   T,S,P  over G there exists a function f   fI   1,24m    1,24m and a class of
functions fI1,I2   1,24m    1,24mIi>0,13 which do not depend on I with the following
properties:
1. Yfx  xY2   Ωδ for every x that in not 2ºh-close to the embedded edge of any
non-trivial end or start of a line (i.e., the embedding of the edge P v, v such that
T v   1 but T Sv   0; or the edge v, Sv for v such that T P v   0,
T v   1, and v x 02n1).
2. f is O1-Lipschitz in Y Y2 norm.
3. f is local in the sense that there exists a class of (sixty four) functions fI1,I2  1,24m    1,24mIi>0,13 which do not depend on I, and f can be defined as an
interpolation between these functions such that:
10In the restated Proposition we have changed the values of the constant δ and h. The constant δ in the
original proposition is replaced by cδ, for sufficiently large constant c, in the present restatement. The constant
h in the original proposition is replaced by 2
º
h in the present restatement. The reason for this change in
constants will become clear in the proof, where the current δ and h will have a natural meaning.
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(a) If the first m-tuple of coordinates of x is 12
º
h-close to the encoded vertex Ev,
but the second m-tuple of coordinates of x is 12
º
h-far from any encoded vertex
Ew then fIv,I2x   fx for every I2 > 0,13.
(b) If the second m-tuple of coordinates of x is 12
º
h-close to the encoded vertex Ew,
but the first m-tuple of coordinates of x is 12
º
h-far from any encoded vertex Ev
then fI1,Iwx   fx for every I1 > 0,13.
(c) If the first m-tuple of coordinates of x is 12
º
h-close to the encoded vertex Ev,
and the second m-tuple of coordinates of x is 12
º
h-close to the encoded vertex
Ew then fIv,Iwx   fx.
(d) If none of the above conditions are satisfied, then fI1,I2x   fx for every I1, I2 >0,13.
In Section A.1 we recall the notations of the embedding that was introduced in Section
4.4. In Section A.2 we construct the function f . In Section A.3 we construct the classfI1,I2Ii>0,13 , using the locality of f .
A.1 Discrete embedding of a graph in the Euclidean space
For convenience, we recall here the notations of our discrete embedding of G in  1,24m from
Section 4.4.
The vertex v is embedded to the point Ev,Ev,0m,0m >  1,24m, which is called
the embedded vertex.
For every edge v,w in G, we define five vertices:
x1v,w < Ev,Ev,0m,0m
x2v,w < Ev,Ev,1m,0m
x3v,w < Ev,Ew,1m,0m
x4v,w < Ev,Ew,0m,0m
x5v,w < Ew,Ew,0m,0m .
The vertices xiv,w are called Brouwer vertices. Note that x1v,w is the embedded
vertex v, x5v,w is the embedded vertex w. The line that connects the points xiv,w and
xi1v,w is called a Brouwer line segment. The union of these four Brouwer line segments
is called the embedded edge v,w.
A.2 The function f
We set h to be a sufficiently small constant such that the
º
h neighbourhood of any two
Brouwer vertices will not intersect and such that the 3h neighbourhood of any two Brouwer
line segments will not intersect- unless they share the same common Brouwer vertex. We
take δ to be a constant arbitrarily smaller than h (δ   h3 suffices). We define a displacement
function g   1,24m    δ, δ4m and f x < x  g x. In order that Properties (1)-(3) of
Proposition 4.8 will be satisfied, we should define g such that:
1. YgxY2   Ωδ for every x that is not 2ºh-close to the Brouwer line segments of any
non-trivial end or starting of a line.
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2. g is O1-Lipschitz.
3. g is defined ”locally”, which will allow as to generate the class of functions fI1,I2.
We think of the 4m coordinates as partitioned into four parts: the first m-tuple of coor-
dinates represent the current vertex in the line; the second m-tuple represent the next vertex
in the line; we think of the third m-tuple as all being equal to a single bit that monitors helps
altering between computing the next vertex, and copying from the second to first m-tuple.
Finally, the last m coordinates represent a special default direction in which the displacement
points when far from all Brouwer line segments (similarly to the single special coordinate in
[HPV89]).
We consider a path starting at 03m,2   1m, i.e. the concatenation of 0 on the first 3m
coordinates, and 2 on the last m coordinates. The path first goes to 04m (in a straight
line), and thereafter the last m coordinates remain constantly 0 (note that every Brouwer
vertex has 0m in its last m-tuple). The first 3m coordinates follow the line according to
the embedding in Section 4.4. This path corresponds to the line starting at 02n1; for any
additional line starting at vertex u, we have another path starting at Eu,Eu,02m.
We say that a point x is in the picture if 1m P
4m
i 3m1 xi @ 1~2. We construct g separately
inside and outside the picture (and make sure that the construction agrees on the hyperplane
1
m P
4m
i 3m1 xi   1~2).
Truncation In order for g   to be a displacement function, we must ensure that it never
sends any points outside the hypercube, i.e. ¦x >  1,24m, we require that also x  g x > 1,24m. Below, it is convenient to first define an untruncated displacement function gˆ  1,24m    δ, δ4m which is not restricted by the above condition. We then truncate each
coordinate to fit in  1,2:  g xi   max1,min2, xi   gˆ xixi. It is clear that if gˆ  
is M  1-Lipschitz, then g   is M -Lipschitz. It is, however, important to make sure that
the magnitude of the displacement is not compromised. Typically, some of the coordinates
may need to be truncated, but we design the displacement so that most coordinates, say 99%,
are not truncated. If gˆ x has a non-negligible component in at least 5% of the coordinates,
then in total g x maintains a non-negligible magnitude.
A.2.1 Inside the picture
The line 0   v0, v1, . . . , v
 in G is embedded to a path in  1,24m that goes in straight lines
through the following sequence of Brouwer vertices:
03m,2   1m, 04m   x1v0, v1,x2v0, v1, . . . ,x5v0, v1   x1v1, v2,x2v1, v2, . . . ,x5P v, v.
Similarly, if I contains another line u, . . . ,w, it is embedded as a path through:
Eu,Eu,02m   x1u,Su, . . . ,x5P w,w   Ew,Ew,02m.
Now we cut the corners of this path as follows: For two consecutive Brouwer vertices s,y
in the embedded path we let z1s y be the point in the Brouwer line segment  s,y that is
exactly
º
h-far from s. Similarly, z2s y is the point in  s,y that is exactly ºh-far from y.
For three consecutive Brouwer vertices s   y   t, the path after ”cutting the corners” goes
in straight lines through
. . . ,z1s y,z
2
s y,z
1
y t,z
2
y t, . . .
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instead of going through s  y   t.
First, for all points inside the picture that are 3h-far from the embedded path after cutting
the corners we use the same default displacement which points in the positive special direction:
gˆ x   03m, δ   1m. Because x is inside the picture, the truncated displacement g x is close
to gˆ x, and therefore satisfies Yg xY2   Ωδ).
Now we define the displacement 3h-close to the embedded path in two regions:
1. For points that are 3h-close to a segment of the form  z1s y,z2s y but (approxi-
mately11)
º
h-far from both Brouwer vertices s,y.
2. For the remaining points, those that are 3h-close to a segment of the form z2s y,z1y t and (approximately11) ºh-close to the Brouwer vertex y.
We make sure that the definitions agree on the interface between the two regions, as well as
on the interface with the points that receive the default displacement.
A.2.2 Close to the path but far from a Brouwer vertex
On the Brouwer line segment, the displacement points in the direction of the path; at dis-
tance h from the Brouwer line segment, the displacement points in towards the Brouwer line
segment; at distance 2h from the Brouwer line segment, the displacement points against the
direction of the path; at distance 3h, the displacement points in the default direction.
Formally, let σs t x denote the magnitude of the component of x  s in the direction
of line s  t,
σs t x < t  sYs  tY2   x  s ,
where   denotes the (in-expectation) dot product. Let z   z x be the point nearest to x on
the Brouwer line segment; notice that z satisfies
z   σs t x t  1  σs t x s.
For points near the Brouwer line segment (Yx  zY2 B 3h), but far from its endpoints
(σs t x > ºh,1 ºh), we define the displacement:
gˆ x <
¢¨¨¨¨¨
¨¨¨¦¨¨¨¨
¨¨¨¨¤
δ
ts
YtsY2
Yx  zY2   0
δ
zx
h Yx  zY2   h
δ
st
YtsY2
Yx  zY2   2h
δ 03m,1m Yx  zY2   3h
(26)
At intermediate distances from the Brouwer line segment, we interpolate: at distanceYx  zY2   13h, for example, we have gˆ x   23δ tsYtsY2  13δ zxh . Notice that every two oft  s, z  x, and 03m,1m are orthogonal, so the interpolation does not lead to can-
cellation. Also, every point z on the Brouwer line segment is Ω 1-far in every coordinate
from 1,2, so the truncated displacement g x still satisfies Yg xY2   Ω δ. For each
case in (26), gˆ   is either constant, or (in the case of Yx  zY2   h) O δ~h-Lipschitz ( zxh
11 It will be more convenient to set the threshold of points x that are “far”/“close” from/to a Brouwer
vertex using the expression σs yx that is defined below. σs yx is closely related to the distance of x
from the points s, y but is not precisely the distance.
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is O1~h-Lipschitz because two “antipodal” points at distance 2h have opposite directions,
both pointing parallel to the Brouwer line segment); by choice of δ P h, it follows that gˆ  
is in particular O 1-Lipschitz. Furthermore, notice that Yx  zY2 is 1-Lipschitz, so after in-
terpolating for intermediate distances, gˆ   continues to be O 1-Lipschitz. Notice also that
at distance 3h the displacement defined in (26) agrees with the displacements for points far
from every Brouwer line segment, so Lipschitz continuity is preserved.
A.2.3 Close to the path and a Brouwer vertex
Let Ly be the line that connects the points zs y and zy t. Given x, we let z be the closest
point to x on Ly.
Our goal is to interpolate between the line displacement for s  y (which is defined up
to σs y x   1 ºh), and the line displacement for y   t (which begins at σy t x  º
h). Let ∆s y x < σs y x  1 ºh, and ∆y t x < ºh  σy t x. We set our
interpolation parameter τ   τ x < ∆y tx∆y tx∆s yx , and set
z < τzs y  1  τzy t. (27)
For points x near y such that ∆s y x ,∆y t x C 0, we can now define the displace-
ment analogously to (26):
gˆ x <
¢¨¨¨¨¨
¨¨¨¦¨¨¨¨
¨¨¨¨¤
δ   τ ysYysY2  1  τ tyYtyY2  Yx  zY2   0
δ
zx
h Yx  zY2   h
δ   τ syYysY2  1  τ ytYtyY2  Yx  zY2   2h
δ 03m,1m Yx  zY2 C 3h
. (28)
At intermediate distances, interpolate according to Yx  zY2. Notice that for each fixed choice
of τ >  0,1 (and z), gˆ is O δ~h   O1-Lipschitz. Furthermore, ∆s y and ∆y t are
1-Lipschitz in x. For any z > Ly, ∆y t z  ∆s y z  ºh. For general x, we have
∆y t x  ∆s y x C ∆y t z  ∆s y z  2 Yx  zY2  ºh  2 Yx  zY2 ; (29)
so τ is O 1~ºh-Lipschitz whenever Yx  zY2 @ 3h, and otherwise has no effect on gˆ x.
We conclude that gˆ is O 1-Lipschitz when interpolating across different values of τ . At
the interface with (26) τ is 1 (0 near zy t), so (26) and (28) are equal. Therefore gˆ is
O 1-Lipschitz on all of  1,24m.
To lower bound the magnitude of the displacement, we argue that z  x is orthogonal toτ ysYysY2  1  τ tyYtyY2 . First, observe that we can restrict our attention to the component
of z  x that belongs to the plane defined by s,y, t (in which z also lies). Let Ps,y,t x
denote the projection of x to this plain. We can write points in this plane in terms of their
∆   < ∆s y   ,∆y t   values. (Recall that s  y and y   t are orthogonal.)
First, observe that ∆ zs y   0,ºh, ∆ zy t   ºh,0 and ∆ y   ºh,ºh.
Notice also that
τ y  sYy  sY2  1  τ
t  yYt  yY2 	  
<@@@>τ
y  zs yº
h
 1  τ zy t  yº
h
=AAA? .
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Putting those together, we have that
∆τ yYy  sY2  1  τ
tYt  yY2 	  ∆τ
sYy  sY2  1  τ
yYt  yY2 	   τ,1  τ . (30)
For z, we have
∆ z   τ∆ zs y  1  τ∆ zy t  ºh 1  τ, τ .
Finally, for Ps,y,t x, we can write
∆ Ps,y,t x   ∆y t x ,∆s y x
 
1
∆y t x  ∆s y x 1  τ, τ .
Therefore ∆ z  ∆ Ps,y,t x is orthogonal to (30).
A.2.4 Close to an end-of-any-line
Close to the non-trivial end or start of any line, we don’t have to be as careful with defining
the displacement: any Lipschitz extension of the displacement we defined everywhere else
would do, since here we are allowed (in fact, expect) to have fixed points.
For concreteness, let s   t be the last Brouwer line segment in a path. In (26), we
defined the displacement for points x such that σs tx B 1 ºh. For points such that
σs tx   1 (i.e. at the hyperplane through t and perpendicular to s   t), we simply set
the default displacement gˆx < δ 03m,1m. For intermediate values of σs tx >  1ºh,1,
we simply interpolate according to σs tx. Notice that this induces a fixed point for some
intermediate point, since for x directly “above” the Brouwer line segment, δ zxh perfectly
cancels δ 03m,1m. Define the displacement analogously at the (non-trivial) start of a path.
A.2.5 Outside the picture
The displacement outside the picture is constructed by interpolating the displacement at
1
m P
4m
i 3m1 xi   1~2, and the displacement at points in the “top” of the hypercube, where xi   2
for every i in the last m coordinates. The former displacement, where Ei>3m1,...,4mxi   1~2
is defined to match the displacement inside the picture. Namely, it is the default dis-
placement everywhere except near the first Brouwer line segment which goes “down” from
s   03m,2   1m to t   04m. Near this line, it is defined according to (26). (Notice thatYt  sY2   1.)
Formally, let z1~2   03m, 12   1m; for x on the boundary of the picture, we have:
gˆ x <
¢¨¨¨¨¨
¦¨¨¨¨
¤¨
δ 03m,1m Zx  z1~2Z2   0
δ
z1~2x
h
Zx  z1~2Z2   h
δ 03m,1m Zx  z1~2Z2 C 2h
(31)
For points x such that P4mi 3m1 xi is very close to 2, the displacement δ 03m,1m is not helpful
because it points outside the hypercube, i.e. it would get completely erased by the truncation.
Instead, we define the displacement as follows:
gˆ x < ¢¨¨¦¨¨¤
δ 03m,1m Yx  z2Y2   0
δ
z1x
h Yx  z2Y2 C h, (32)
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Figure 1: Geometry near a Brouwer vertex
s
zs y
y zy t t
x
z
The figure (not drawn to scale) shows some of the important points near a Brouwer vertex y:
There is an incoming Brouwer line segment from s through zs y, and an outgoing Brouwer
line segment to t through zy t. For each point x between the dashed lines, we assign a
point z on the line Ly as in (27), and define the displacement according to (28). Outside the
dashed lines (including at y itself), we use the default displacement δ 03m,1m.
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where z2   03m,2   1m. When θ < P4mi 3m1 xi > 1~2,2, we interpolate between (31) and
(32) according to
θ1~2
3~2 .
A.3 The class of local functions fI1,I2
We start with defining two functions fv,w and fu,v,w which will be used in the definition of
the class fI1,I2.
Given v,w such that v,w is an edge of the directed graph G, for x that is 2ºh-close to
exactly one embedded edge v,w, we consider the definition of f in the case where v,w
is an edge of the line, and we define fv,w using the truncated displacement of Equations (26)
and (28) depending on whether the point is close to one or two Brouwer line segments. For
completeness of the definition (although it will not be used), we also define fv,w at other
points x inside the picture using the truncated default displacement. And for x outside the
picture we define fv,w in the same way we have defined f (see Section A.2.5). We can think
of fv,w as “the function f in case the line goes through v,w”.
Given u, v,w such that u, v and v,w are edges of the directed graph G, for x that
is 2
º
h-close to the embedded vertex x1v,w, we consider the definition of f in the case
where u, v and v,w are edges of the line, and we define fu,v,w using the truncated
displacement of Equation (28). For completeness of the definition (although it will not be
used), we also define fu,v,w at other points x as we did for the function fv,w . We can think
of fu,v,w as “the function f in case the line goes through u, v and v,w”.
Now we define the class fI1,I2:
 For x outside the picture and every I1, I2, we define fI1,I2x as in Subsection A.2.5,
which does not depend on the line.
 For x that is 2
º
h-far from all Brouwer line segments, and every I1, I2, we define
fI1,I2x according to the default displacement (which coincides with the definition of
f).
 For x that is 2
º
h-close to exactly one embedded edge from v to w the definition is as
follows. For i   1,2, let Ii   Ti, Si, Pi be the local information of two vertices. In this
region we define fI1,I2 by cases.
- If the first m-tuple of coordinates is 8
º
h-close to Ev or Ew but T1   0, we
define fI1,I2x using the truncated default displacement.
- If the first m-tuple of coordinates is 8
º
h-close to Ev but the S1-successor of v
is not w (recall that each vertex has two possible successors the 0-successor and
the 1-successor) we define fI1,I2x using the truncated default displacement.
- If the first m-tuple of coordinates is 8
º
h-close to Ew but the P1-predecessor of
w is not v we define fI1,I2x using the truncated default displacement.
- For the second m-tuple of coordinates we define similarly but with respect to
I2   T2, S2, P2.
- In all remaining cases we define fI1,I2x   fv,wx.
 In the remaining case, x is 2
º
h-close to two embedded edges, therefore it has to be
2
º
2
º
h @ 3
º
h-close to an embedded vertex v (i.e., x1   Ev,Ev,0m,0m). This
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follows from the fact that any two consecutive Brouwer segments are orthogonal. There-
fore, both the first and the second m-tuple of coordinates are 12
º
h-close to encoding
Ev.
We denote by u the P1-predecessor of v, and by w
 the S1-successor of v. In this region
we define fI1,I2 as follows.
- If T1   T2   1, S1   S2 and P1   P2, then we define fI1,I2x   fu,v,wx.
- Otherwise, we define fI1,I2x using the truncated default displacement.
It can be checked that indeed the properties (a)-(c) in the proposition are satisfied.
Roughly speaking, this follows from the fact that we defined the function fI1,I2 in a way
that uses the information of I1 in the case when the first m-tuple of coordinates in close
to a valid vector, and it uses the information of I2 in the case when the second m-tuple of
coordinates in close to a valid vector. Regarding property (d), we first note that every point
on any Brouwer line segment has either the first or the second m-tuple of coordinates a valid
encoding of a vertex Ev. This is because by the construction one of this m-tuples remains
unchanged. Therefore, if x is 2
º
h-close to such a line then either the first or the second
m-tuple of coordinates is 8
º
h-close to a valid encoding of a vertex. Hence, the last property
simply follows from the fact that fI1,I2 is defined using the default displacement in the case
of a point that is far from all Brouwer line segments.
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